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Starting in the early 1980s there began a series of changes to patent
policy and practice in the U.S. that have had the generally perceived effect of
strengthening the protection that patents provide, and extending the
applicability of that protection institutionally, geographically, and
technologically.  Roughly coincident in time with these significant changes in
the legal and institutional environment, there has been a dramatic,
historically unprecedented surge in patenting by U.S. inventors.  This
confluence of events provides a major challenge and opportunity for scholars
of technological change and for science and technology policy.  On the one
hand, significant changes in property-rights regimes do not happen very often
and provide, at least in principle, an unusual set of “natural experiments”
that ought to greatly improve our ability to understand how different regimes
affect behavior.  On the other hand, policy-makers have a right to expect that
social scientists can analyze these developments and provide vital input
regarding the economic and social consequences of policy changes of this sort.
In this survey, I will highlight the major policy changes that have
occurred and review the existing analyses by economists that attempt to
measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of
technological change.  I will also review the broader theoretical and empirical
literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy.  To
give away the punch line:  despite the significance of the policy changes and
the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions
regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes
in patent policy are few.  The primary reasons for these disappointing results
appear to be:
1.  many aspects of the environment for innovation are changing at the
same time, making it difficult to distinguish the effects of policy
changes from the effects of other contemporaneous developments;2
2.   patents are only one among many determinants of the returns to
innovative behavior, so that even significant changes in patent
policy may have only limited effects; and
3.  economic theory makes predictions about the effects of policy
parameters that are sometimes quite sensitive to model
assumptions, and it is often difficult to connect specific changes in
patent rules and practices to the theoretical constructs.
The paper begins with a brief overview of the major changes in patent
law and policy that have occurred.  It then proceeds to review the literature.
This review is organized around empirical and analytical issues rather than
the specific policy changes, but the connections should be clear.  Next I
discuss a few current policy debates in light of the existing literature.  I
conclude with some summary comments and the traditional observations
about what kinds of additional research would appear to be most needed.
As with any review, there are many things omitted.  The most
important category of omissions is that this paper is primarily about patent
policy in the U.S.  Although I will discuss to some extent the international
harmonization of patent rules related to the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, I do not consider in
any detail many important differences between the U.S. patent system and
those of other countries.  Even within the U.S., there have been a number of
additional changes in patent rules that I will not consider, either because
their applicability is relatively narrow, because there has been little analysis
of their effects, or simply because I didn’t get to them.  Finally, there is a
voluminous legal literature that is closely related to the economic analysis
that I describe, and many of the changes that I discuss have complicated and
subtle legal nuances that I do not understand.  Readers interested in those
aspects of these issues should consult Merges (1997).
II.  Important Policy Developments
The changes in patent policy that I will discuss can be grouped into
four broad categories:  (1) the creation of a new court to review patent3
decisions and the apparent associated improvement in the likelihood of
success in court for patentees; (2) the extension of patenting and licensing
privileges to inventors in universities and government laboratories who
create commercially exploitable inventions partly or wholly with the use of
federal research funding; (3) the extension and clarification of the
applicability of patent rights to new technological areas, particularly software
and gene research; and (4) the agreements under the Uruguay Round of the
GATT negotiations to extend and harmonize patent protection around the
world.
Although framed by the issues of international competitiveness that
have come to the fore in the last several decades, recent debates over patent
policy contain many echoes of earlier debates.  For reviews of this historical
background, see Kaufer, 1989, Merges (1997) or Penrose (19zz).
A. Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC)
At the end of the 1970s, the U.S. patent system was widely perceived
to be weak and ineffective.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was
overworked and understaffed; in 1979 they simply stopped granting patents
for a while.  In fast-moving technological fields, the general perception was
that an invention would be obsolete before the PTO would get around to
granting a patent on it.  The Justice Department, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Courts took a rather dim view of patents, often
interpreting efforts to enforce patent rights through a lens of antitrust law
and concluding that many patent and licensing practices were
anticompetitive.  Most patents whose validity was litigated were eventually
held to be invalid (Koenig, 1980; Merges, 1997).
Beginning in 1980, this situation was essentially reversed.  The
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that stated that monopoly power
was the purpose of the patent grant, so that efforts to enforce patents and
extract the monopoly rents they generate were not, in and of themselves,4
violations of antitrust laws.  Congress passed a series of laws that
strengthened and streamlined the patent office.  Most importantly, Congress
passed the Federal Courts Improvements Act in 1982.  This law created a
new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) to which were assigned
appeals from the many district courts of all patent cases.  This was described
as a procedural reform, designed to standardize patent law across the country
and eliminate the incentives for “forum shopping” in which patentees would
try to bring cases in court circuits sympathetic to patents while alleged
infringers would seek out circuits believed hostile.
This change in procedure is widely believed to have had a profound
impact on the substantive outcomes of patent litigation.  Before 1980, a
district court finding that a patent was valid and infringed was upheld on
appeal 62% of the time; between 1982 and 1990 this percentage rose to 90%.
Conversely, before 1980 appeals courts overturned only 12% of district court
findings of patent invalidity or non-infringement; that percentage rose to 28%
in the later period (Koenig, 1980; Harmon, 1991).  As a result, the overall
probability that a litigated patent will be held to be valid has risen to 54%
(Allison and Lemley, 1998).1  Patentees asserting infringement are also now
more likely to be granted a preliminary injunction barring the sale of the
alleged infringing product during the litigation (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1998).
B. Changes affecting universities and government labs2
Although the fraction of U.S. R&D funded by the federal government
has been declining over the last two decades, in 1997 it was still the source of
                                                
1 It is important to emphasize that these probabilities are conditional on the patent
being litigated.  The decision to litigate is itself endogenous.  One would expect that a Court
more friendly to patentees would induce patent holders with more marginal cases to file
infringement actions, and also induce some of the clearer infringers to settle rather than face
the Court.  This endogeneity suggests that the increase in the conditional probability of
success is likely to understate the extent to which the Court has become more favorable to
patentees.  Research on patent litigation is discussed further below.
2 This section is adapted from the discussion in Jaffe and Lerner, 1999, and
Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998.  The part based on Jaffe and Lerner was originally
written by Josh Lerner.5
approximately 30% of all R&D expenditure.  Further, in the university sector,
where federal funding now accounts for about 60% of all research
expenditure, federal funds provide part of the support for the vast majority of
projects, so that the rules governing the patentability of Federally-supported
research essentially control university patenting.
A substantial literature discusses federal policies towards the
patenting and commercialization of the innovations whose development it
has funded.3  Even a casual review of these works, however, makes clear how
little the debate has changed over the decades.  Many advocates have
consistently called for government to take title to innovations that it funds, in
order to ensure the greatest diffusion of the breakthroughs.  Others have
argued for a policy of allowing contractors to assume title to federally funded
inventions, or alternatively allowing the exclusive licensing of these
discoveries.
While questions concerning the federal government’s rights to patent
the results of publicly funded  research were the subject of litigation and
Congressional debate as early as the 1880s, the debate assumed much
greater visibility with the onset of World War II.  The dramatic expansion of
federal R&D effort during the War raised questions as to the disposal of the
rights to these discoveries.  Two reports commissioned by President Roosevelt
reached dramatically different conclusions, and framed the debate that would
follow in the succeeding decades.
The first of these was the National Patent Planning Commission, an
ad hoc body established shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack to examine the
disposition of the patents developed during the War.  In its January 1945
report, the Commission highlighted the tradeoffs associated with the practice
                                                
3This issue was the topic of over forty congressional hearings and reports and four
special commissions between 1940 and 1975 (U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration, 1976).  Three helpful overviews of the historical debates are Forman (1957),
Neumeyer and Stedman (1971), and Hart (1998).6
 of the government’s taking title to new inventions and issuing royalty-free
non-exclusive licenses.  (This was the general policy prior to the War in all
non-defense agencies.)  While this practice assured the rapid diffusion of
easily commercialized innovations, the Commission cautioned that:
It often happens, particularly in new fields, that what is
available for exploitation by everyone is undertaken by no one.
There undoubtedly are Government-owned patents which
should be made available to the public in commercial form, but
which, because they call for a substantial capital investment,
private manufacturers have been unwilling to commercialize
under a nonexclusive license (U.S. House, 1945, p. 5).
Rather than recommending a uniform policy, the commission urged that the
practices be allowed to vary across agencies.  It urged the creation of a
central body to monitor the patent policies of the various agencies, and to
ensure that these policies appropriately reflected the national needs.
A second report, completed in 1947 by the Department of Justice, took
a very different tack.  It argued that “innovations financed with public funds
should inure to the benefit of the public, and should not become a purely
private monopoly under which the public may be charged for, or even denied,
the use of technology which it has financed” (U.S. Department of Justice,
1947, p. 2).  The report urged the adoption of a uniform policy forbidding both
the granting of patent rights to contractors and exclusive licenses to federal
technology in all but extraordinary circumstances.
Shortly after the report’s release, the Justice Department was asked to
draft a new policy, which was issued by President Truman in 1950 as
Executive Order 10096.  This new policy largely reflected the Department’s
recommendation: it called for a centralized policy across the federal
government, to be implemented by a Government Patent Board.  While there
is little statistical evidence about how the Board implemented its charter,
Forman’s (1957) review of its unpublished decisions indicates that it was far
more supportive of awarding and licensing patents to contractors and7
government employees than might have been anticipated from the
circumstances around its creation.  Furthermore, some evidence suggests
that some agencies clandestinely persisted in policies that were quite
different from those promulgated in the Executive Order (Neumeyer and
Stedman, 1971).  In 1963, President Kennedy’s “Statement of Government
Patent Policy” explicitly allowed agencies to adopt different policies, and in
some cases to grant “greater rights than a nonexclusive license” to
contractors or third parties.
From this time until the 1980s, there was no comprehensive federal
policy regarding patenting of results from publicly funded research.  A few
universities patented fairly actively.  University patents during this period
represented either (1) the fruits of university research with no federal
funding; (2) patents sought for the public or professional prestige that they
confer, rather than any desire for commercial exploitation; or (3) inventions
from federal research for which a title rights waiver was received from the
federal agency funding that research.  Some agencies negotiated blanket
agreements with specific universities permitting them to patent and exploit
the results of research funded by that agency, and other agencies routinely
granted waivers allowing universities to exercise property rights in particular
patents.  Other agencies rarely or never granted such waivers.
In the late 1970s, the argument that exclusive property rights were
necessary if inventions derived from public research were to be developed
resurfaced, and won new attention in a time of increasing concern about the
country’s overall technological performance.  The ultimate result was a series
of statutory and administrative changes that eventually made virtually all
public research subject to the possibility of private patents and/or exclusive
licensing.  The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-
480) explicitly made technology transfer a mission of all federal laboratories
and created a variety of institutional structures to facilitate this mission.
Among other steps, it required that all major federal laboratories establish an8
Office of Research and Technology Applications to undertake technology
transfer activities.  The law required all facilities with an annual R&D
budget of at least $20 million to devote at least one full-time employee to this
office.
At about the same time, the Bayh-Dole Act (technically the Patent and
Trademark Laws Amendment of 1980, or P.L. 96-517) allowed universities
and other non-profit institutions automatically to retain title to patents
derived from federally funded R&D, removing the need to get an explicit
waiver from the funding agency in order to exploit patent rights.  In addition,
Bayh-Dole explicitly recognized technology transfer to the private sector as a
desirable outcome of federally financed research, and endorsed the principle
that exclusive licensing of publicly funded technology was sometimes
necessary to achieve that objective.  The passage of P.L. 98-620 in 1984
expanded the rights of universities further, by removing certain restrictions
contained in Bayh-Dole regarding the kinds of inventions that universities
could own and the right of universities to assign their property rights to other
parties.
The Bayh-Dole Act also explicitly allowed government-operated
laboratories (such as the National Institutes of Health) to grant exclusive
licenses on government-owned patents.  Over the course of the 1980s, a series
of initiatives extended and broadened the possibilities for patenting by
federal laboratories.  A variety of implementing memoranda, executive
orders, and legislative clarifications in the 1982 through 1987 period
extended many of these provisions to government-owned, contractor-operated
(GOCO) facilities, which include the large facilities such as Los Alamos,
Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and Lawrence Livermore, that are typically known
as National Laboratories.
This wave of legislation and administrative action did not resolve the
debate concerning the extent to which ownership of government-funded R&D
ought to be transferred to private sector entities.  Congressional and agency9
investigations of inappropriate behavior during the commercialization
process—particularly violation of fairness of opportunity and conflict of
interest regulations during the spin-out and licensing process—continued to
be commonplace.  The view that no one should be excluded from enjoying the
fruits of public research is still expressed.  As discussed further below, these
controversies have, in recent years, impinged on the patenting activities of
the federal labs and have led to continued debate about the desirability of at
least some forms of university patenting.  Nonetheless, we have witnessed a
general transformation of the system from one in which patenting of
inventions derived from public funding was the exception to one in which
such patenting is widespread.
C. Expansion of the realm of patentability4
Roughly concurrent with these statutory changes in who could acquire
patent rights, there were significant changes in what could be patented.
These changes were not brought about primarily by Congressional action, but
rather by the re-invigorated patent office, which has taken a series of fairly
narrow Court decisions regarding new subject matter and generally
interpreted them quite broadly.  There are now patents for genetically
engineered bacteria, genetically altered mice, particular gene sequences,
surgical methods,  computer software, financial products, and methods for
conducting auctions on the Worldwide Web.  For each of these, there would
have been prior to 1980 at least serious doubt as to whether or not they
would be deemed by the PTO and the courts to fall within the realm of
patentable subject matter.  It is probably not accidental that these
expansions in the realm of patentability prevented patents from being
irrelevant to several of the most important and dynamic technological sectors
of the current era.
                                                
4 The question of what constitutes patentable subject matter is a complex one.  I
intend in this section to convey only the basic tenor of the expansion of patentability.  For a
detailed discussion of these issues, see Merges (1997).10
Particularly important and controversial has been the expansion of
patentability of software and financial service products and processes for
offering them.  Historically, these were viewed as difficult to patent because
algorithms and methods of doing business had been held to be unpatentable.
But these presumptions have gradually been either overturned or found to be
irrelevant.  Beginning in 1981, the Supreme Court held that software that
was part of manufacturing system or process was patentable (Diamond v.
Diehr).  Later decisions held that a wide variety of software that was in some
way supportive of physical processes was patentable.  In 1998, the CAFC
upheld a patent on a software system that performs real-time accounting
calculations and reporting for use by mutual fund companies (State Street
Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group).  This decision
explicitly rejected the notion that “business methods” were inherently
unpatentable, and appeared to place very few limits on the patentability of
software and financial service products.
D. Changes related to the GATT Agreement
Part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on the GATT was an
agreement reached in late 1993 on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (“TRIPs”).  In addition to committing the U.S. to making some
important changes in its patent system (discussed below), the TRIPs
agreement achieved major changes desired by the U.S. in the patent policy of
other countries.  The most important provisions are:
•  Virtually all commercially important technological areas must be
included within the realm of patentable technology.  The most
important effect of this agreement is to prohibit the practice,
common in many developing and some developed countries, of not
recognizing patents on drug products.  Prior to TRIPs, some
countries also did not grant process patents.
•  Patents must be granted for 20 years.
•  Patent applications must be tested for non-obviousness and utility
as in the U.S. patent system.11
•  Patent holders must have the right to prohibit the importation of
infringing products.
•  Limitations are placed on the circumstances under which
governments can order compulsory licensing of patents.
Compulsory licensing can be required in the U.S. only in very
special circumstances, but some other countries had much broader
compulsory licensing policies.
Overall, these provisions are seen as constituting a major
strengthening of patent protection around the world, if and when they are
fully implemented.5
The changes to the U.S. patent system brought about by TRIPs are
contained in P.L. 103-465, passed in 1994.  The most important of these is to
change the patent term from 17 years from date of grant to 20 years from
date of application.  Certain patents already applied for but not yet granted
were given a patent term equal to the greater of these two.  As of this writing,
Congress is also considering other changes that would make the U.S. patent
system more consistent with those of other countries.  One of these is
changing the procedure for determining priority of inventions from our “first
to invent” rule to the “first to file” rule used in most other countries.  Another
change under consideration would modify the U.S. practice of maintaining
the secrecy of patent applications, by publishing all applications 18 months
after they are filed.
                                                
5 Some developing countries are allowed until 2005 to fully comply with the
requirements to grant drug patents.  As of 1995, however, they were required to accept
applications for patents on new pharmaceutical products and to grant exclusive marketing
rights for any of these products that obtain a patent grant in another GATT country.12
III.  The Theoretical and Empirical Literature
A. The overall trend in patenting and research
Figure One shows the dramatic increasing in U.S. patenting since the
mid-1980s.6  Patenting by U.S. inventors in the U.S. had been constant or
declining for much of the 1970s and early 1980s.  But beginning in 1984, and
accelerating in 1988, patent applications by U.S. residents began to increase,
with a corresponding increase in patents granted.  Figure One also shows an
upward trajectory for total R&D expenditure in the U.S. that began earlier,
in the latter half of the 1970s.  Thus at least part of the increase in patenting
is likely to be the output of this increased R&D expenditure, although the
approximate decade-long lag between the upturn in R&D and the upturn in
patenting is too long to be consistent with microeconomic evidence suggesting
that the there is little or no lag at the firm level between changes in R&D
spending and changes in patent application rates (Hall, Griliches and
Hausman, 1986).
In fact, domestic patenting had been more or less constant at 40 to 50
thousand patents per year for most of this century, corresponding to a
gradually declining rate of patenting relative to the population or the size of
the economy.  To focus on the issue of patenting intensity, Figure Two shows
the number of patents scaled in two ways.  The lower line represents the total
domestic patent grants charted in Figure One, divided by the U.S. adult
population.  The upper line is the number of patents that were assigned at
time of issue to U.S. corporations (typically about 80% of domestic patents),
divided by constant-dollar R&D performed by industry in the U.S.  By either
of these measures, patent intensity declined significantly over the 1970s,
                                                
6 In Figure One and throughout the paper, I use the phrase “domestic patents” to
refer to patents granted to individuals residing in the U.S.  Patents with multiple inventors
are considered domestic if the first inventor resides in the U.S.  Below, I also look at data for
patents assigned at issue to U.S. corporations.  Approximately 80% of patents issued to
domestic inventors are assigned to U.S. corporations.  There are also a small number of
patents with inventors residing abroad that are assigned to U.S. corporations.13
with the decline relative to R&D being particularly large because the
increase in R&D spending in the second half of the decade was not initially
associated with any greater patenting.  By the mid-1980s, however, both of
these series are moving up, indicating that patenting is increasing faster
than population or real R&D expenditure.
Thus a long-term secular decline in the intensity of patenting activity
in the U.S. reversed in the mid-1980s, and the trend since that time has been
steadily upward.  In the 1990s, U.S. inventors have been receiving patents in
record numbers, with the one-year total of over 80 thousand in 1998 more
than double the number received in any year from 1979 through 1986.  The
Figures show that part, but not all, of this increase is associated with an
increase in R&D expenditure.7  I will return below to the increase in R&D
expenditure and its connection to the patent surge, but I review first the
literature that has looked at the patent surge itself in more detail.
This is a historic change in the U.S. innovation process that deserves
careful scrutiny.  The most thorough analysis to date is that of Kortum and
Lerner (1998).  They consider four possible explanations.  The first they dub
the “friendly court” hypothesis, by which they mean that the creation of the
CAFC made patents more valuable, and hence increased the “propensity to
patent” of U.S. inventors.  Not all inventions are patented, and not even all
potentially-patentable inventions are patented.  Inventors balance the time
and expense of the patent process, and the possible loss of secrecy that
results from patent publication, against the protection that a patent
potentially affords to the invention.  The “friendly court” hypothesis is that
the increased probability of success associated with the new court has shifted
                                                
7 Indeed, because R&D expenditure increased for a decade before patenting started to
increase, even the record level of patenting in 1998 is significantly less than the rate that
would be predicted based on current R&D expenditures if the patent/R&D ratio had
remained at its 1970 level.14
that balance, causing a higher proportion of potentially-patentable inventions
to be patented.
A variant of the “friendly court” hypothesis sees the changes of the
1980s as an example of “regulatory capture,” in which the large firms that
dominate the research and patenting processes in the U.S. managed to
induce the government to change the rules in their favor.  Under this
hypothesis, the increase in patenting would be dominated by those firms,
taking advantage of the new favorable environment that they had created.
The third hypothesis is that there has been a shift in “technological
opportunity” that has made more invention possible.  This “fertile technology”
hypothesis points particularly to new areas such as biotechnology and
information technologies as the source of the growth in patenting.  The final
hypothesis considered by Kortum and Lerner is that the process of research
and invention has become more productive.  Such an increase in research
productivity might be attributed to changes in research technology (Arora
and Gambardella, 1994), such as the application of information technology
and computers to problems that had previously been handled heuristically, or
to changes in the management of the research process, including an
increasing emphasis on the kind of applied research that is likely to generate
patents (Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996).
To distinguish among these hypotheses, Kortum and Lerner look at
the patent data in several ways.  First, they argue that the friendly court
hypothesis suggests that U.S. patents have become more valuable for all
inventors, and so we should have seen an increase in patenting in the U.S. by
foreigners roughly coincident to the increase by domestic inventors.  Further,
since this hypothesis suggests an increase in the propensity to patent but no
increase in the number of inventions, it suggests that U.S. inventors should
not necessarily have increased their rate of patenting in other countries.
Neither of these implications is borne out by the data.  Although patenting by
foreigners in the U.S. has increased, it was increasing rapidly before the15
1980s and there is no sign of acceleration during the friendly court period.
Further, patenting by U.S. inventors has increased abroad.  Put differently,
an analysis of the U.S. and other industrialized countries as both “sources”
and “destinations” for patent applications shows that the U.S. has become a
significantly greater source, but has not become a more important
destination.  This clearly suggests that the friendly court effect is not the
primary explanation for the increase in domestic patenting.8
Kortum and Lerner also show that the data do not support either the
fertile technology or regulatory capture hypotheses.  In particular, although
there is significant variation in the rate of growth of patenting across
technological areas, approximately 70% of all patent classes have exhibited
an increased rate of patenting.  While biotechnology and information
technology classes have grown more rapidly than others, the overall increase
in the patent totals is due to widespread increases across technological areas.
Similarly, the increase is not confined to large firms.  On the contrary, in
recent years the fraction of patents going to new firms and the fraction going
to firms that previously had relatively few patents have both increased.
Through this process of elimination, Kortum and Lerner conclude that
there must have been an increase in the productivity of the research process,
at least in terms of its ability to produce the kinds of innovation that lead to
patents.  They then ask whether an increase in the productivity of research is
consistent with the observed behavior of the research expenditure series.
They develop a simple model of research-driven endogenous economic growth,
in which an unexpected permanent increase in the productivity of R&D is
predicted to lead to a transitory increase in R&D as well as patents.  The
difficulty with fully reconciling this prediction with the data is that R&D
began its increase so much sooner than patenting.  If research productivity
                                                
8 Kortum and Lerner also show that the fraction of applications that are successful
has not dropped for U.S. inventors, as might be expected if a rising propensity to patent was
leading to more marginal patent applications.16
began to increase in the 1970s, there should have been an effect on patenting
rates within a few years.9
Thus the surprising conclusion of Kortum and Lerner’s careful analysis
is that the explanation for the patent surge lies outside the patent system
itself, despite the coincidence of timing with important changes in patent
enforcement.  This conclusion is, however, possibly reinforced by survey
evidence that indicates that the usefulness of patents as a means for
protecting the returns to innovation did not increase over the decade of the
1980s (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 1997).  This survey, a follow-up to the so-
called “Yale” survey administered in 1983 (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and
Winter, 1997) asked R&D managers across manufacturing industries about
the effectiveness of diverse mechanisms for appropriating the returns to
research.  Despite the fact that firms are taking out many more patents, R&D
managers, at least, do not perceive patents to be any more effective.
Cohen and his co-authors suggest that the reconciliation of the jump in
patenting and lack of increase in perceived effectiveness may lie in the
multiple ways that firms use patents.  In particular, their survey shows that,
in addition to protecting the returns to specific inventions, firms use patents
to block products of their competitors, as bargaining chips in cross-licensing
negotiations, and to prevent or defend against infringement suits.  It is
possible that respondents did not consider these benefits of patents when
answering the question about the effectiveness of patents in protecting the
returns to innovations.  More fundamentally, firms using patents for these
purposes are engaging to a significant extent in a zero- or negative-sum
game.  If all firms do more blocking, accumulating of bargaining chips, and
patenting to fend off infringement suits, it could easily be the case that, in
                                                
9 Kortum and Lerner also note that the decline in R&D in the early 1990s as
patenting continued to surge was puzzling.  With several more years’ data, the R&D dip in
1993-94 appears to be a short-term fluctuation, not necessarily an end to the gradual upward
trend.17
 the end, none of them has succeeded in increasing their returns to
innovation.  Under this hypothesis, what has happened is that everyone is
patenting more because the private, marginal return to patenting is high—
but firms’ actions largely offset each other so that the perceived value of
patents overall is no higher.
This hypothesis is partially supported by Hall and Ham (1999).  They
analyzed in detail the patenting of semiconductor firms, and interviewed
patent lawyers and intellectual property managers at semiconductor firms.
They conclude that large firms do, indeed, use patents primarily in large
portfolios that are used as the basis for negotiation of cross-licensing
agreements.  Because of the systems nature of semiconductor technology, it is
virtually impossible to make products or processes that do not incorporate
others’ technology to varying degrees, and so everyone “needs” cross-licensing
agreements in order to avoid risking infringement suits.  Further,
semiconductor fabrication facilities are large, capital intensive facilities, so
even the remote threat of an injunction that could shut down production is
viewed as an unacceptable economic risk.  Although cross-licensing
agreements have always been common in the industry, the strengthening of
patent protection in the 1980s brought new attention to the value of patent
portfolios.10  The resulting “patent portfolio race” is consistent with rising
rates of patenting and rising patent/R&D ratios without there being any
perceived improvement in the net value of patents in protecting the value of
innovations.
Hall and Ham also show, however, that part of the increase in
patenting in this industry reflects a more traditional use of patents as the
                                                
10 In addition to the creation of the CAFC and associated legal decisions, the ability
to protect chip designs was enhanced by the creation of a new property right covering chip
layout by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.  Semiconductor executives also
mentioned the profound effect on industry thinking of Texas Instruments’ vigorous and
successful efforts in the late 1980s to extract royalties on its patents from many of its
competitors.18
means to protect the value of inventions.  The period of rising patenting has
coincided with a time of significant entry by new firms into the industry,
many of which are so-called “fab-less” manufacturers who design chips and
contract their manufacture to others.  Presumably, this separation of design
from manufacture, and the resulting reduction in the barriers to entry into
chip design, would not be possible if the designing firm could not protect its
creation from appropriation by the contracting manufacturer.  Hall and Ham
show that the pattern of patenting by small firms and new entrants is
consistent with this hypothesis.
In summary, there is at best limited evidence that the upsurge in
patenting resulted, at least directly, from the strengthening of patent
protection in the 1980s.  Much of the increase can be associated with an
increase in real R&D spending that began much earlier.  At the end of the
day, it is extremely difficult to identify the causal effects of multiple
interacting endogenous variables.  It seems plausible that the combination of
technological opportunities, the buildup in government R&D spending and
defense procurement, increased international competitive pressure and other
factors increased the returns to R&D in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  It is
likely that these increases would have led over some time horizon to more
patenting, even if there had been no changes in the patent regime.  But the
strengthening of the patent system presumably reinforced these incentives.
It is possible that the R&D boom would not have been so large or lasted so
long without this reinforcement.  It is disquieting, however, that there is so
little empirical evidence that what is widely perceived to be a significant
strengthening of intellectual property protection had significant impact on
the innovation process.19
B. Patenting by universities and federal laboratories.
Figures Three and Four are analogous to Figures One and Two,
showing the increase in patenting for publicly funded research institutions.11
Figure Three shows that both universities and National Labs significantly
increased their patenting between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s,
although the patenting in the Labs peaked in 1993, while university
patenting has continued its rapid increase.  In 1997, almost 5% of all patents
assigned to U.S. non-governmental institutions were assigned to universities.
It is worth noting that university patenting was also increasing throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s; statistical tests do not reveal a significant “break”
in the university patent series in the early 1980s (Henderson, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg, 1998).
Figure Four shows the patent intensity (patents per million inflation-
adjusted R&D dollars) for these two groups of institutions.  University
research spending was increasing strongly over most of this period, so that
the increase in patent intensity is somewhat less than the increase in overall
patenting.  Nonetheless, between 1980 and 1997, university patents per
dollar more than tripled.  National Lab funding, on the other hand, increased
more slowly in the 1980s, and in fact has been declining in real terms since
1989.  Thus the patent intensity of the Labs more than quadrupled between
1980 and 1993, though it has declined somewhat since then.
More detailed analysis of these series appears in Henderson, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (1998) for university patents and Jaffe and Lerner (1999) for the
Lab patents.  Important observations about the university patents are:
                                                
11 The totals for the National Labs refer to the 23 Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers (“FFRDC”) owned by the Department of Energy and operated by
outside contractors.  The patent totals shown include both patents assigned to the
government and those that are assigned to the lab contractor under their operating
agreements.  The procedure for identifying these patents is described in detail in Jaffe and
Lerner (1999).20
•  The increase reflects in part the spread of active patenting to many
more institutions.  In 1965, 30 academic institutions received
patents; this increased to about 150 in 1991 and over 400 in 1997.
•  University patenting is disproportionately concentrated in
technology classes related to the health sciences.  The increase in
university patenting is not, however, explained primarily by the
growth of these fields.  Universities have increased their patenting
in all broad technological areas.
•  The increase in university patenting has been associated with a
decline in the apparent “quality” of university patents, as indicated
by the frequency of citation by future patents.  Prior to 1980,
university patents were significantly more highly cited than other
patents, controlling for technology fields.  This difference had
completely disappeared by 1988.  Much of the change corresponds
to a dramatic increase in university patents receiving no citations
in the first 5 years, from 10% in 1975 to 43% in 1987.
•  This decrease in citation-measured “quality” is partially due to the
lower average quality of patents of institutions that had not
previously patented.  But there was also a measurable decline in
average quality at the top patenting institutions.12
•  The increase in university patenting cannot be causally attributed
to the passage of Bayh-Dole; other contributing factors were an
increase in industry research funding, an increased attention to
applied research, and the growth of university technology offices.
But the dramatic increases of the last two decades probably could
not have occurred without the greater patenting freedom granted by
Bayh-Dole.
Beyond the explosion in university patenting, there is accumulating
case-study evidence that the desired economic benefits of technology transfer
from universities have occurred.  Studies of MIT (Pressman, et al., 1995;
Shane, 1999), the University of Minnesota (Severson, 1999), and Columbia,
Stanford, and the University of California (Mowery, et al., 1998; Mowery and
                                                
12 Mowery and Ziedonis (1999) provide a more recent and detailed look at this issue
for the patents of Stanford and the University of California.  They find no decline in average
citation intensity for these two institutions.  Interestingly, they do find a decline in licensing
“yield,” defined as the average licensing revenue per patent.21
Ziedonis, 1999) have documented that new or expanded technology licensing
offices in the post-Bayh-Dole period have licensed university technology to
private firms that are investing significant resources in developing new
products and process using those technologies.13  Jensen and Thursby (1998),
using both a theoretical model and survey results from many major
universities, show that much of the technology being licensed is in the “proofs
and prototypes” stage and would therefore never be developed commercially
without exclusive licenses.  They also argue that the assistance of the
university inventors is necessary as the development process is carried out,
and that patent royalties play an important role in inducing this cooperation
from the academics.
The underlying story for the National Labs shows some similarities
and some interesting differences relative to what happened in universities:
•  Lab patenting is highly concentrated, with a handful of the largest
labs contributing the vast majority of the patents.
•  Labs with strong national security and basic science missions are
less patent intensive, on average.
•  There is some evidence that competition for the contract to operate
a Lab stimulates patenting activity relative to those Labs with
long-term stable contractual relationships.
•  Unlike universities, the increase in Lab patenting does not appear
to have been associated with any decline in quality, as measured by
citation intensity.  Whereas the universities appear to have
increased patenting by looking harder for patentable inventions
within the same research areas, it may be that the Labs had more
incentive and ability to respond to the technology transfer
incentives by refocusing their attention into new, commercially
relevant areas.
•  As in universities, the “institutionalization” of patenting through
the creation and expansion of technology transfer offices played a
key role.  The decline in patenting in the Labs in the mid-1990s was
associated with cutbacks in these operations in response to
congressional criticism of these activities.
                                                
13 See also U.S. General Accounting Office (1998).22
•  Controversy over the Labs’ relationships with outside firms and
alleged conflicts of interest have inhibited patenting and technology
transfer from the Labs.
C. Patenting in new areas
As noted above, since 1980 patents have been granted in areas of
biotechnology and computer software that were previously considered
essentially unpatentable.  Probably not coincidentally, these have also been
areas of extraordinary technological fecundity.14  As discussed by Kortum and
Lerner, it is difficult to identify either biotechnology or software patents in
the aggregate in a systematic way.  They undertook a comprehensive analysis
based on the international patent classification (IPC) system.  On this basis,
they show that biotechnology patents grew from 3% of all patents in 1969 to
about 6% in 1991, and that software increased from about 4% to almost 7%
over the same period (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, Figure 10).  It is widely
perceived that these trends have accelerated in more recent years.
To give some indication of what these trends might look like, Figure
Five shows the number of patents over time in a few selected U.S. patent
classes that are likely to be indicative of trends in biotech and software
patenting.  These classes surely contain patents that are not truly biotech or
software, and they represent only a fraction of the relevant patents, so they
should be treated merely as suggestive.  If they are indicative, however, then
these areas have experienced even more phenomenal growth in the 1990s
than they did in the 1980s.  For example, USPTO Class 435, Molecular
Biology and Microbiology, accounted for about .5% of all patents in 1985
(about the same as in 1977).  This rose to about 1% in 1990,  1.3% in 1995
and then grew dramatically to 2.5% in 1998.  Classes 600, 601, 602, 603, 604,
606, 607 and 623, all of which deal with “Data Processing,” accounted for
about .4% of all patents in 1977, .7% in 1985, 1.2% in 1990, 1.6% in 1995 and
                                                
14 When I suggest that this is not a coincidence, I mean that the fecundity of these
areas probably influenced the patent office to want to allow patents in these areas, not that
the new patentability induced the technological fecundity.23
2.6% in 1998.  For both of these groups, the large percentage jumps between
1995 and 1998 occurred despite an overall increase in patenting in that
interval of over 40%; both of these categories more than doubled in absolute
terms in just 3 years.  Thus it does seem to be the case that patenting is
growing very rapidly in these categories, although Kortum and Lerner’s
conclusion that these technologies do not explain the growth in total
patenting remains true.
D. Issues Related to Patent “Scope”
Patent scope is a crucial determinant of the value of the patent right.
While the scope of any particular patent is, in principle, defined by the
specific claims that the patent office permits the inventor to make, there is a
generic policy issue or set of issues related to how broadly patent rights will
generally be interpreted.  Thus patent “scope” or “breadth” constitutes a
potentially  important lever for innovation policy.  Indeed, the area of patent
scope seems to be one in which the CAFC has had an important impact on
patent doctrine.  Further, issues related to patent scope have received
significant theoretical attention by economists in the last decade, and there is
also a small empirical literature.  Hence this set of issues presents an
interesting case study of the possible interactions among theory, statistical
analysis, and legal and policy decisions.
At the most general level, patent scope or patent breadth refers to the
size of the region of technology space from which a patentee may exclude
others from operating.  Clearly, a broader patent is more valuable to the
patentee.  It seems a natural step from this observation to conclude that a
patent system that generally confers broader scope makes invention more
valuable, and thereby provides greater innovation incentives.  The problem,
of course, is that ex ante an inventor also has to worry about producing an
invention that will be judged to infringe someone else’s patent; broader
patent scope makes this more likely and hence makes research riskier and
less valuable.24
Because of this tension, analysis of the welfare consequences of patent
scope involves more than just the classic tradeoff between the objective of
encouraging innovation at the cost of creating (static) monopoly power.  The
rate of innovation itself is not necessarily increasing with increases in patent
scope, because of actual or perceived constraints that increasing patent scope
places on inventors’ expectations regarding their ability to profit from their
own inventions.
1.  Theoretical analysis of patent scope
It is useful to distinguish three types of scope issues, based on the
relationship between an invention and the other inventions that may or may
not infringe depending on the patent scope that is awarded.  The first
situation is where the potentially infringing invention is developed
independently of the patented invention.  The second situation is that of
“cumulative innovation,” in which the potentially infringing invention builds
upon the patented invention.  The third situation is that of inventions that
are research tools, useful only or primarily for the specific purpose of
developing other inventions.  In reality, of course, actual patent disputes may
have elements of all of these, but the theoretical analysis tends to treat them
separately.
Independent inventions.  Waterson (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990)
and Klemperer (1990) analyze the issue of patent “breadth” in a context of
non-cumulative innovation.  The issue of breadth or scope is viewed in the
context of the tradeoff between providing monopoly profits to the inventor to
stimulate innovation versus the static efficiency losses of market power.  This
market power and associated losses are greater when the monopolist controls
a larger region in product space.  The welfare tradeoff with respect to scope is
thus analogous to the welfare tradeoff related to the duration of patent
protection, and the problem is to choose a combination of breadth and
duration that minimizes the welfare loss associated with providing any given
level of innovation incentive.  Within this framework, a generalized increase25
in patent breadth or scope, holding all else equal, unambiguously increases
the innovation rate, because it does not affect the incentives of subsequent
potentially infringing inventors.
Cumulative invention.  The case of cumulative invention has received
considerable theoretical attention.  Adopting Newton’s powerful metaphor,
economists have tried to develop models in which sequences of inventors all
“stand on the shoulders” of the “giants” who came before them (Scotchmer,
1991).  Kitch (1977) views this as a problem of optimal coordination among
different researchers working on related technologies.  In the absence of
coordination, there will be wasteful duplication of effort, and possibly
overinvestment as firms seek to beat each other to important results.  Kitch
argues that granting of broad patent rights to a pioneering inventor early in
the development of a line of technology will allow that inventor to ensure
optimal orderly development of the technology.  To the extent that other
inventors have ideas or capabilities that contribute to the development of the
technology, the pioneering inventor would have an incentive to include them
in the development process, via cross-licensing or other contractual
arrangements.
Later work has brought the incentives of the potential follow-on
inventors explicitly into the models. The question of scope or breadth can be
characterized in terms of the magnitude of the improvement that an
invention must represent before it will be granted a patent of its own, and/or
before it will be held to infringe the patent of the previous inventor (Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; O’Donoghue, 1998).  This line of research generally
confirms Kitch’s view that broad patent protection should be afforded to the
initial invention in a cumulative development line.  The intuition behind this
result is that the incentive to create broad “shoulders” for others to stand on
is inadequate because this elevation of future inventors represents a positive
externality (Chang, 1995; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer, 1996;
O’Donoghue, 1998). Scotchmer (1996) even argues that “second-generation”26
products should not be patentable at all.  This maximizes the research
incentives for the first innovator.  Further, if the first and second innovators
can bargain over the terms of a licensing agreement before the (potential)
second inventor sinks any of its research investments, the first innovator will
have the incentive to license her technology to the second whenever it is
optimal to do so, under terms that do not prevent the development of the
second-generation invention.15
Hopenhayn and Mitchell (1999) explore the implications of the fact
that inventions differ in the extent to which they spawn fertile lines of
subsequent inventions.  Ignoring the kinds of ex ante agreements that
Scotchmer uses to ensure that infringing “second-generation” products will
still be developed, they show that broad patent scope is more costly for more
fertile inventions, because it may inhibit these subsequent developments; on
the other hand it is important to provide good incentives to develop such
“fertile” inventions to begin with, because they are socially very valuable.
They show that overall innovation incentives can be improved by offering
patentees a “menu” of combinations of patent duration and patent scope or
breadth.  Optimal construction of this menu induces patentees to reveal their
private knowledge regarding the fertility of their inventions, and thereby
achieves a better balance between the incentives of the initial and
subsequent inventors than can be achieved with uniform patent scope.
Hopenhayn and Mitchell suggest that a mechanism with properties such as
theirs could be implemented by allowing patentees to choose different types
of patents with different durations and different legal rights.  As an example,
they suggest that patentees might be required to accept shorter patent
                                                
15 Of course, this approach presumes that the trajectory of innovation is known in
advance. As emphasized by evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), it is more
often the case, particularly early in the development of a new line of technology, that no one
knows which directions of improvement are possible or desirable.  This makes ex ante
licensing seem unlikely.27
durations in order to receive the benefit of protection against infringement
under the Doctrine of Equivalents (discussed below).
Patented research tools.  The case of patented research tools can be
thought of as a special case of cumulative innovation in which the initial
invention in the sequence has no value except as a platform for future
invention (Scotchmer, 1996).  I consider it separately, partially because it has
gotten significant policy attention (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Unlike the
typical situation of cumulative innovation, the research tool does not typically
compete in the marketplace with the products developed using it.  Thus the
development of the downstream product does not reduce the profit stream of
the research tool inventor.  On the contrary, if the patented tool has no direct
commercial market, its owner can profit only to the extent it is used in other
inventions.  This would seem to make this situation in some sense easier
than that of cumulative innovation, because the incentives of the research
tool inventor and the research tool user are more in line with each other:
they both want the downstream product to be produced and sold; the only
question is how much should the research tool inventor receive in royalties
for the use of the tool.
Schankerman and Scotchmer (1999) investigate the enforcement of
patents for research tools from the perspective of maximizing the incentives
to develop such tools.  They consider whether it is necessary to grant the
patentee the right to an injunction preventing the sale of products developed
with the tool, or whether the availability of damages for patent infringement
is sufficient.  They show that the current legal treatment of patent damages
as a “reasonable royalty” is logically flawed, so that maximizing the incentive
to develop research tools requires either that injunctions be available, or that
the damage rule be changed to award to the research-tool patentee the profits
earned by the infringer.28
2.  Empirical studies of patent scope
There has been relatively little analysis of the effects of different
degrees of patent scope.  Such studies are very hard to do, because it is very
difficult to measure patent scope in a systematic way across large numbers of
patents, and because there are very few natural experiments in which
different degrees of patent scope can be observed.
Lerner (1994) examines whether patents that appear to have relatively
broad scope are more valuable to the patentees than narrower ones.  He
examines biotechnology firms, whose value is closely tied to their intellectual
property.  He shows that firms whose patents span more International
Patent Classes (IPCs) are valued more highly by venture capitalists.  While
this does not address directly the question of the effect of broad changes in
patent scope, it provides threshold support for the underlying idea that
broader scope increases value and thereby increases innovation incentives.
On the other hand, Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel (1999) do not find that the
number of IPCs is related to patent value, as measured in survey responses
by patent owners.
Branstetter and Sakakibara (1999) estimate the impact of an apparent
increase in the scope of Japanese patent protection.  Prior to 1988, the
Japanese patent system essentially allowed only one claim per patent.  A
complex invention, or one with many distinct applications, could be covered
by many separate patents, leading this system to be referred to as the
“sashimi” system, in reference to the thinly-sliced fish dish.  All of these
distinct patents had to be non-overlapping; you could not get a patent whose
claim covered some of the same material as the claim of another patent, even
your own.  In 1988, Japan converted to a system much like the U.S. system,
in which a single patent can have multiple claims.  Beyond the change in how
claims are packaged into a particular number of patents, the effect of this
change is that it is now possible to stake out a set of overlapping claims.
Branstetter and Sakakibara argue, based on discussions with Japanese29
companies and patent experts, that in many cases it is not possible to protect
a complicated invention or one with several applications using a series of
independent claims.  Even the most complete set of independent claims
leaves “holes” in technology space that can only be covered with overlapping
claims.  Therefore, the change to the multi-claim system effectively increased
patent scope by permitting more effective protection of these inventions.
Branstetter and Sakakibara hypothesize, based on models such as
those of Klemperer and Gilbert and Shapiro discussed above, that such an
increase in patent scope would increase the return to inventive activity,
which should be observable in two ways.  First, R&D spending by Japanese
firms should rise.  Second, Japanese firms should produce more inventions;
since the incentives created by the U.S. patent system did not change in
1988, this should lead to an increase in patenting by Japanese firms in the
U.S.  The paper shows that neither of these occurred, although it is worth
noting that this was a period in which both Japanese R&D and Japanese
patenting in the U.S. were rising; the negative conclusion is that there is no
measurable increase in the rate of growth associated with the time at which
the policy change occurred.  It is possible that these negative results mean
that, despite the impression of the managers that Sakakibara and
Branstetter interviewed, the ability to file overlapping claims does not result
in a significant increase in patent scope.  It is also possible that there was an
effect, but it is just to difficult to see it in data series that are changing
rapidly for other reasons.  Otherwise, these results suggest that changes in
patent scope do not have significant effects on research incentives.  This could
be because scope doesn’t really matter, because it is too hard to anticipate ex
ante what the consequences of different regimes might be, or because the30
conflicting effects on initial and follow-on innovators tend to cancel each other
out.16
The only paper that I know of that presents evidence on how patent
scope affects innovation in the U.S. is Merges and Nelson (1990).  The
evidence is not statistical, but rather an examination of the development of
several historically important technologies.  Based on these cases, Merges
and Nelson question the conclusion of Kitch (and implicitly, the later work of
Scotchmer, Chang, O’Donoghue and others) that broad patent protection for
pioneering innovators is desirable.  The analytical basis for the disagreement
is that Merges and Nelson believe that ex ante uncertainty and disagreement
among competitors about which lines of development will be most fruitful
makes licensing agreements or other coordination mechanisms unlikely
and/or ineffective. Examining the historical development of electrical
lighting, automobiles, airplanes and radio, they argue that the assertion of
strong patent positions, and disagreements about patent rights, inhibited the
broad development of the technologies.  While it is obviously difficult to know
if these technologies would have developed more rapidly without the
assertion of strong patent rights by early inventors, it is certainly clear that
the different inventors did not succeed in reaching agreements to coordinate
their activities.  On the other hand, Merges and Nelson argue that
semiconductor technology benefited greatly from broad licensing of the
original AT&T patent, which was brought about largely because AT&T was
prevented by its antitrust consent decree from exploiting the patent itself.
Thus these case studies, while obviously not definitive, do raise doubts about
both the underlying assumption (that different inventors will license their
technologies to each other if it is efficient to do so) and the conclusion (that
                                                
16 It is probably just coincidence, but it is provocative that Branstetter and
Sakakibara have a finding for Japan that is analogous to what happened in the U.S.  They
show that the “break” in the Japanese R&D series occurs in the early 1980s.  Thus, just as in
the U.S., there was  an increase in R&D spending that preceded the change in patent policy.31
strong property rights for pioneering inventors maximize innovation) of much
of the theoretical work on cumulative innovation.
Overall, there is a noticeable gap between the highly developed
theoretical literature on patent scope and the limited empirical literature.
This is due partially to the infrequency of changes in patent regimes like the
one examined by Sakakibara and Branstetter.17  Part of the difficulty also
lies in the weakness of the connection between the model constructs and
quantifiable aspects of a patent regime.
E. The effect on LDCs of stronger intellectual property
protection
The extension of product patent protection, particularly on drugs, to
the less-developed world was clearly motivated by a desire of the U.S. and
other technologically advanced countries to keep more of the profits from
research.  Implementation and enforcement of intellectual property
protection is more likely to be carried out, however, if it brings some benefits
for the LDCs themselves.  Mansfield (1994) presents survey evidence that
multinational firms are more likely to locate a research facility in a country
that has strong IPR policies.  Scherer and Weisbrod (1995) examined the
effects of the institution of protection for drug patents in Italy on the Italian
pharmaceutical industry.  They found that pharmaceutical innovation was
not stimulated, largely because the Italian industry was specialized in the
exploitation of the previous property regime through the production of off-
brand versions of drugs patented elsewhere.
Lanjouw (1998) and Lanjouw and Cockburn (1999) argue that, in
addition to possibly stimulating domestic innovation, LDC patent protection
for drug may induce more research throughout the world into treatments for
diseases that are prevalent in the third world. Lanjouw and Cockburn show
that this second effect is potentially very large, as there are a number of32
diseases that have huge worldwide effects that are relatively understudied by
the world’s drug companies.  They generally conclude that it is too soon to tell
if this will change, although they present some evidence of an upsurge in
malaria research.
F.  Patent litigation
Much of the theoretical literature regarding patent design assumes
that a patent, once granted, allows the patent holder to prevent competition
from infringing inventions.  In practice, of course, infringement can
sometimes only be prevented through costly litigation, the outcome of which
is typically uncertain.  This raises two important policy issues.  Does the cost
of enforcing patent rights significantly reduce the value of patents as an
innovation incentive?  And, does the risk of patent litigation from other
parties reduce the incentive to engage in innovation even where the intention
is not to infringe?
Analysis of these issues through the lens of data on patent
infringement cases is complicated by the fact that we do not observe the
patents that are successfully enforced without resort to litigation, and we
generally do not know the outcome of cases that are settled out of court.  Of
course, the decisions to bring suit, to abandon an allegedly infringing product
under threat of suit, or to settle out of court, are all endogenously determined
by the parties’ perceptions of their chances.  Hence statistics regarding the
observed outcomes must be interpreted with caution.
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) explore the determinants of patent
litigation, by comparing patents that are litigated to a random sample of all
patents.  They show that patents that are litigated tend to have more claims
and more citations per claim, which they interpret to mean that litigation is
more likely when the stakes are high.  They also show that litigation is more
                                                                                                                                                
17 Cross-sectional comparisons between countries with differing patent systems may
provide some insight (Ordover, 1991).  But in comparing different countries so many things
differ that it is difficult to draw strong conclusions.33
likely when a patent is part of a stream of related development work, as
evidenced by the number of citations received from subsequent patents on
related technologies owned by the same firm.  Overall, the litigation rate is
about 1% of all patents, which I consider surprisingly high, given the large
numbers of patents that are granted that turn out to be worthless. There are
large differences across technology fields in the likelihood of litigation, with
the likelihood of litigation in the Drugs and Health field roughly double the
overall average.  Lerner (1995) finds that within biotechnology about 6% of
all patents end up in litigation.
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) look at the determinants of litigation
in the context of an explicit model of the parties’ decisions leading to an
actual trial.  These decisions are affected by the stakes, by the magnitude of
legal fees, by the expected probability of winning, and by the uncertainty
about the outcome.  Interestingly, they find that intellectual property cases
(involving patents, trademarks or copyrights) appear to have a lower
inherent outcome uncertainty than contract, labor, prisoner or tort disputes.
They also find that the implied average expected likelihood that the plaintiff
will prevail is about 35% for the IPR cases, which is higher than all of the
other categories except contracts.
Allison and Lemley (1998) investigate the determinants of the
outcomes of litigation over patent validity.  They find that overall just over
half of patents whose validity is litigated to final resolution are held to be
valid.  They find that validity is more likely to be upheld if the case is heard
by a jury.  They find that the probability of validity does not vary
significantly by technological field or the nationality of the inventor.  They
also note that the average final validity finding occurs about 9 years after the
patent was granted and about 12 years after the application date.
Both the implied expected success probability of Siegelman and
Waldfogel and the empirical success probability of Allison and Lemley are
conditional on the case being filed to begin with.  Since such cases are34
presumably filed only after the patentee has been unsuccessful in stopping
infringement without filing suit, and infringers are presumably less likely to
give up without a fight in those cases where the patent is weaker, the
unconditional probability of success is presumably higher than the
probability of success conditional on the case having gone to court.  Waldfogel
(1998) attempts to estimate the unconditional probability by examining how
the observed success probability varies with the duration of the court case.  If
parties learn about their chances over time, then the cases resolved most
quickly reflect most closely the overall unconditional success probability.  He
finds that cases that are resolved within 3 months are won by the patentee
84% of the time and cases resolved within a year are won 61% of the time.
This suggests that the fact that only half of cases carried to conclusion are
won by the patentee greatly understates the likelihood that a random patent
can be enforced.
On the question of whether the threat of patent suits might deter
innovation, Lerner (1995) finds that firms with high litigation costs (proxied
by small capitalization and lack of previous patent experience) are less likely
to patent in patent classes with many previous awards by rival firms.
Further, they tend to avoid those classes occupied by rivals that themselves
have relatively low litigation costs.  These results suggest that the perceived
danger of patent litigation does affect firms’ research decisions, and
differentially affects those decisions depending on the firms’ abilities to
engage in litigation.
IV.  A Sampling of Current Policy Debates
A. Policy debates related to patent scope
There are three current policy or legal debates that I will discuss in the
context of patent scope.  The first is a perceived decline in the standard for
non-obviousness imposed by the patent office in examining patents; the
second is the perceived expansion of the “Doctrine of Equivalents” under the35
CAFC; and the third is a debate over the perceived increase in the
enforcement of patents on research tools.
1.  Perceived increase in granting of “obvious” patents
With respect to any given patent, there are often disagreements as to
whether the “inventive step” embodied in the patent is large enough to justify
a finding that the invention is not obvious and hence it is entitled to a patent.
In recent years, however, there has been a widespread sense that the patent
office is granting large numbers of patents on trivial inventions.  I am not
aware of any attempt to document this phenomenon systematically; indeed, it
is not clear to me how it could be done.  All of the measures of patent scope
that have been used empirically, such as number of patent classes per patent,
citations per patent, and claims per patent, are subject to variations over
time in patent office practice.  For this reason, they are typically thought of
as relative measures, i.e., in any given year a set of patents with a higher
average claims/patent is broader than a set with a lower average.  It would be
a much bigger leap to interpret changes over time in the aggregate averages
for any of these measures as telling us anything meaningful about changing
patent scope.18
Within the analytical framework of the theoretical models, a decline in
the standard for non-obviousness would be interpreted as a decline in patent
scope; if a subsequent inventor needs to take only a small step past me to get
a patent, then the scope of my patent is narrow.  It is unclear, however,
whether this is really the correct interpretation of what is going on or
perceived to be going on.  An alternative interpretation would be that there
has been a decline in the quality of the patent examination process.  Patent
examiners are simply making more mistakes, granting patents that should
                                                
18 One possibility might be to look at the variance of these measures rather than the
mean.  On the assumption that the rate of generation of “big” inventions has been stable,
then a lowering of the standard for non-obviousness could perhaps be interpreted as
producing a greater spread in actual patent “size” as more very small inventions are mixed
into the distribution of patents.36
not be granted.  Indeed, it is perhaps to be expected that the rapid increase in
the number of patents examined, and, perhaps more importantly, the
expansion of patenting to new fields of technology, would lead to greater
variability in the examination process.  Under this interpretation, it is not
that patent scope has decreased, but just that more noise has been introduced
into the system.  Eventually, this should lead to an increase in the frequency
with which patents are found to be invalid, but it could be that not enough
time has passed for this to be observed.
2.  The Doctrine of Equivalents
While the granting of arguably “obvious” patents implies a decline in
patent scope, it is widely believed that patent scope has been increased in the
U.S. in the last two decades as a result of more liberal application of the
Doctrine of Equivalents.  The Doctrine of Equivalents holds that an invention
that does not literally infringe upon the claims of a patent should nonetheless
be found to infringe if the differences are insubstantial.  The idea behind the
Doctrine is that to limit enforcement of the patent to literal infringement
“would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be
subordinating substance to form” (Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods.,
1950).  To prevent this, the Supreme Court said that an invention that
performs the same function, in the same way, with the same result, would be
judged to infringe.
Using this function-way-result test, the CAFC has upheld a number of
important findings of infringement.  In the 1995 Hilton-Davis case, it upheld
a jury finding of infringement of a patent describing a chemical process
occurring in the pH range from 6 to 9 and a pressure range from 200 to 400
psig, where the infringement was by a related process that occurred at pH 537
and pressure of 500 psig.19  In doing so, it held that the function-way-result
test could be supplemented by other evidence that relates to whether the
differences between the patent and the alleged infringing invention are
“insubstantial.”  In particular, it found that evidence as to whether the
potential infringer knew of and “designed around” the patent, while not
directly relevant to the question of infringement, could be used as evidence
regarding how substantial the differences were.  It also confirmed that the
question of infringement under the Doctrine was a factual one to be
determined by the jury if the case was before a jury.
The extent of infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents is clearly
closely connected to the theoretical analysis of the effects of patent scope on
cumulative innovation.  Indeed, this connection was explicitly recognized in a
concurring opinion by Judge Newman in the Hilton-Davis case:
The principle of equivalency thus serves a commercial purpose,
as it adjusts the relationship between the originator and the second-
comer who bore neither the burden of creation nor the risk of failure.
However, there is also the major consideration of the progress of
technology.  How does the existence of a “doctrine” that transcends the
statutory purpose of legal notice of the patent’s scope affect that
progress?  Does the doctrine of equivalents affect the research,
development, investment and commercialization decisions of today’s
technologic industry, in a way that concerns the national interest?
And if not, what’s all the fuss about?
Despite our national dependence on technologic advance, there
is a sparseness of practical study of whether and how the doctrine of
equivalents affects modern industrial progress and public welfare.
(Concurring decision by Judge Pauline Newman in Hilton-Davis v.
Warner Jenkinson, Fed. Cir. 1995, reproduced in Merges (1997), page
886)
                                                
19 This decision was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Warner Jenkinson v. Hilton
Davis (1997).  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the CAFC for reconsideration of
certain issues, but did not fundamentally overturn the CAFC’s holding.  The Supreme Court
decision emphasized that infringement under the Doctrine occurs when any differences
between the patent and the alleged infringement involve elements that people skilled in the
art knew were interchangeable.38
This sounds like a clear and valuable challenge to the research
community.
B. The patenting of research tools
The growth in biotechnology industries and the growth in patenting by
universities have combined to create increasing concern about the
consequences of the enforcement of strong patents on research tools.  As
stated by Heller and Eisenberg (1998), “Policy-makers should seek to ensure
coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to minimize restrictive
licensing practices that interfere with downstream product development.
Otherwise, more upstream patent rights may lead paradoxically to fewer
useful products for improving human health.”
As noted above, at one level one would think that strong property
rights on research tools do not create a dilemma.  The creator of a research
tool will not generally desire to suppress its use.  It will be in all parties’
interests to devise licensing agreements to ensure that socially valuable uses
of research tools are not inhibited.  Under this view, the current complaints
about the enforcement of patents on research tools can be attributed to the
elimination of the “free-ride” that previously existed because universities did
not have clear patent rights.  Enforcing these patent rights may cost
downstream firms part of their profits, but this will create good incentives to
develop new research tools, and will not inhibit their use because they will be
licensed.
This logic can be questioned on two fronts.  First, as was pointed out as
far back as the 1947 Justice Department report discussed above, one can
question on equity grounds why a subsequent researcher should have to pay
a university to use technology that was developed with tax dollars.  Second,
Heller and Eisenberg question whether licensing will work well enough to
ensure that research tools can be used.  They note that the rapid advance of
biotechnology, combined with the proliferation of patents on important
research tools, puts a researcher in a position where she needs multiple39
licenses in order to market any given product.  This creates a situation where
the transactions costs necessary for this coordinated bargaining may cause
the bargaining to break down completely.  The result is what they call a
“tragedy of the anti-commons,” in which multiple overlapping and possibly
ambiguous private property rights make it difficult or perhaps impossible for
anyone to use the pool of research methods that have been developed.
Beyond the general statement quoted above, Heller and Eisenberg are
not specific about how they would minimize the ability of research tool
patentees to inhibit subsequent use.  In an earlier paper, Eisenberg (1989)
proposed that patents for research tools should not be entitled to injunctions
that bar the sale of infringing products; they should be entitled only to a
reasonable royalty on the use of the research tool.  This would, in effect,
implement compulsory licensing of research tools.  Compulsory licensing has
not historically played a prominent role in the U.S. patent system; as noted
above, the U.S. bargained for limitations on compulsory licensing are part of
the TRIPs agreement.
A more fundamental difficulty with the “reasonable royalty” approach
is noted by Schankerman and Scotchmer (1999).  Reasonable royalties have
historically been interpreted to mean that the infringer pays as damages the
royalty that the patentee and the infringer would have agreed to in a
hypothetical licensing negotiation in which both parties knew that the patent
was valid and a license was needed to avoid infringement.  But, in the
absence of a right to an injunction, the outcome to that negotiation itself
depends on the damages that the two parties believe the patentee could
demand if the negotiations fail and the infringement occurs.  Hence it is
circular to base the damages on that hypothetical negotiation.
It would seem that there are really two distinct issues here.  In cases
where the research-tool patentee is a private firm, it does not seem that the
tradeoffs between that patentee’s rights and incentives and the possible
inhibition on subsequent invention is really very different than with respect40
to other patents.  As recognized by Heller and Eisenberg, there are other
industries where complex packages of patent rights have to be obtained, and
the problems seem to be solved by patent pooling and cross-licensing
agreements.20  Certainly, no compelling case has been made for radical
remedies such as eliminating patentability or effectively imposing
compulsory licensing.  Firms that develop new research tools already have
the option of attempting to keep them secret instead of patenting them; if
patents were made unavailable or less valuable, secrecy would become more
attractive, making subsequent use of the tools by others less likely rather
than more likely.
Patenting of research tools by universities and other publicly funded
institutions arguably represents a different situation.  It seems implausible
that patent rights have much bearing on these entities’ incentives to engage
in research that develops new research tools.21  The original argument for
Bayh-Dole was that potential inventions from university research would lie
unused in the absence of patent protection, because they needed a lot of
subsequent development investment that would not be undertaken unless the
patents could be licensed exclusively to a commercial firm.  Research tools do
not fit this model.  They are not typically licensed exclusively, and we
certainly wouldn’t want them to be.  But when they are licensed non-
exclusively, the patent right and resulting royalties amount, in Heller and
Eisenberg’s phrase, to a “tollbooth” on the biotechnology development
highway.  This was not the argument made for Bayh-Dole, and it is not clear
that it is socially desirable.
It is also unclear, however, if it is practical to selectively limit
enforcement of research tool patents by public research institutions.  A return
to the pre-Bayh-Dole regime would also eliminate patents on other
                                                
20 Of course, these institutions may be quite inefficient.  See Hall and Ham (1999).
21 The availability of patent royalties may, however, affect researchers’ incentives to
cooperate in facilitating their commercial use.  See Jensen and Thursby (1998).41
commercial products, which seem to have been an important avenue of
technology transfer.  A prohibition on non-exclusive licenses would be likely
to hinder broad technology transfer rather than facilitate it.  An attempt to
statutorily distinguish research tools from other inventions might be
problematic.  Thus it may be that the only practical approach is to use public
scrutiny and moral suasion to encourage these entities to license research
tools widely and easily.
C. Are software patents bad?
Despite (or perhaps because of) the rapid increase in software
patenting, there is widespread debate about the desirability of software
patents.22  The arguments why software patents are undesirable include:
•  Software products tend to be “systems” constructed from many
different pieces.  Allowing patents on pieces of software creates an
untenable need to secure or at least consider many different
licenses in order to market any given product.
•  The above need for multiple licenses will favor large firms that can
amass patent portfolios and thereby bargain for cross-licensing.
The genius of the software industry is in small firms that will be
driven under.
•  In order to work, distinct pieces of software need to interface with
each other, to provide inter-operability.  Standards are needed.
Patents on elements of standards or interfaces can provide very
broad monopoly power.
•  Software changes so quickly that it will have changed by the time a
patent is issued.  Many of the patents being issued are for software
ideas that have been around a long time.
•  It wasn’t broke; we shouldn’t have tried to fix it.
As we have seen, the first point is not unique to software.  Other
industries deal with these problems, although that does not mean that the
outcome is necessarily socially desirable (Hall and Ham, 1999).  With respect
to the second point, it may be that small firms will have more difficulty
                                                
22 As noted above, the expansion in the patentability of software has been part of a
broader expansion that includes financial products and methods.  Some, but not all, of the
issues raised in this section apply to this broader category.42
achieving cross-licensing agreements, but it is also true that small firms may
have fewer other weapons besides patents to protect their inventions, and so
in some cases may need patents more.23
The inter-operability problem is discussed by Merges (1999).  He
argues that the intellectual property system (including patents) will likely
deal with it by using common-sense rules to prevent patents on “small pieces”
of a system from controlling a disproportionately large market.  On the fourth
point, rapidly changing technology should not, in principle, lead to an
increase in obvious patents; the obviousness of the patent is supposed to be
judged as of the time of application.  As noted above, however, applying
consistent standards for patentability may be particularly difficult in new
and rapidly changing fields.  It is unclear how the courts will sort this out.
The last point should be taken seriously, at least by researchers.
Although many things are changing at once, it would be useful to try to say
something about the extent to which the greatly increased importance of
patents in this industry has affected the innovation process. The challenge is
to try to figure out ways to disentangle the co-evolution of innovation in this
sector and the rules that govern it.  Does the earlier period show that patents
are unnecessary in this area?  Is there some reason why patent protection
became more necessary as the industry evolved?  Or is the movement to
patent protection killing the Golden Goose?
D. First to file versus first to invent and publication of
applications
As noted above, the U.S. recently changed its patent duration from 17
years from date of grant to 20 years from date of application, in order to
conform to practice in the rest of the world.  We still differ from other
countries, however, in (1) granting patent priority to the “first-to-invent”
                                                
23 Hall and Ham (1999) find that patents in semiconductors are used to a significant
extent to amass patent portfolios to be used in negotiation.  But they also find that design
firms and new entrants rely on patents to protect their products when they contract with
larger firms for manufacturing services.43
rather than the “first-to-file,” and (2) keeping patent applications secret
indefinitely pending the grant decision.  Legislation has been introduced to
change these as well.  This legislation is generally supported by the large
companies and the intellectual property bar (Blount, 1999), but has also
generated significant opposition, including a letter signed by 10 Nobel
Laureates in Economics and 16 Nobel winners in other fields.24
In addition to the desire to harmonize U.S. rules with the rest of the
world, part of the motivation for these changes comes from perceived abuses
of the patent review process, in which applicants manage to revise their
original claims during the review period in light of subsequent discoveries.
The extreme version of this takes the form of so-called “submarine patents.”
These are patents based on old, allegedly vague applications, kept alive
within the patent office by repeated continuations that modify the invention
to reflect developing practice.  Then, after the technology has ripened, the
patent “surfaces” and other companies are surprised to learn that products
that they have developed infringe the just-issued patent.  While changing the
patent duration so that it runs from the application date reduces this danger,
publication of applications would make a bigger difference with respect to
technologies for which 20 years is a very long time.
The most famous (or infamous) practitioner of the submarine patent is
the late Jerome Lemelson, who held patents on components of VCRs, ATMs,
cordless phones, fax machines, compact cassette players, welding robots and
machine vision and image processing, which he used to extract significant
royalties from companies that thought they were using only their own
technologies.  Blount (1999) shows that patents with very long pendancy
periods are a very small fraction of all patents.  Of course, because patents
differ greatly in their importance, the fact that potential submarine patents
                                                
24 The letter was drafted by Franco Modigliani.  See http://www.alliance-
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are few in number does not necessarily mean that they are economically
unimportant.
There has been relatively little systematic analysis of the consequences
of changing filing and disclosure regimes.  Scotchmer and Green (1990) show
that the first-to-file rule generally leads to disclosure of more information.
Aoki and Prusa (1996) consider the effect of the availability of information on
competitors’ pending applications on other firms’ patent filings.  They show
that such disclosure induces firms to patent smaller inventions, and that
firms’ profits are greater under the open-disclosure system, because firms do
not waste resources on developing products that are about to be precluded by
someone else’s patent.  This analysis is taken further by Aoki and Spiegel
(1998).  They consider a model in which new products go through a “research”
phase and a “development” phase.  A firm that has successfully completed the
research phase may apply for a patent.  The patent may or may not be
granted, and, if granted, may or may not ultimately be enforced by the courts.
Once any firm completes the research phase, firms compete in the
development phase, with the firm that originally succeeded in the research
having a headstart on development; this headstart is reduced when the
patent application becomes public.
Some of the results in this model depend on the strength of patent
protection, i.e., how likely it is that a patent will be upheld and thereby
protect the innovation from competition.  In general, they find that early
disclosure of applications reduces the rate of innovation, but raises the
probability that any given innovation will be carried through the
development phase and reach the product market.  For some plausible
parameter values, early disclosure makes consumers better off and raises
total welfare.
Clearly, this is an issue deserving of more research, particularly if
famous economists are going to write letters supporting or opposing
particular statutory changes.  The Aoki and Spiegel paper is attractive45
because it directly confronts the pending policy issue, and does so in a way
that incorporates many features of the real world, including the uncertainty
that always exists regarding whether a given patent will ultimately be
enforced.
V.  Conclusion
Economists have known for some time that patents are not the only—
or in most industries the most important—mechanism for preserving
incentives for innovation.  Ironically, this understanding was solidified at
approximately the same time as the apparent importance of patents began to
rise.  In the last two decades patents have arguably become stronger (in the
sense of more likely to be upheld) and broader (the expanding Doctrine of
Equivalents), become available for the first time in a significant way to the
public research community, become available for a number of important
categories of innovation that were previously largely unpatentable, and had
their reach extended within the developing world.
I have taken the view that it would be surprising if major changes in
the patent system did not affect the innovation process.  This is consistent
with the view of Judge Newman that encouraging innovation was (or ought to
have been) the motivation behind the policy innovations.  Unfortunately, it is
not possible to make very many robust statements about the effects of these
changes on the innovation process.  The only clear set of conclusions is that
the extension of patent protection to publicly funded research does seem to
have had a significant impact in increasing technology transfer from this
sector.  Otherwise, we have fairly limited empirical results; the results we
have generally suggest that the innovation process was not affected.  This
limited success is due partially to the difficulty of measuring the parameters
of patent policy, and partly due to the difficulty of discerning statistically
significant effects when many things have been changing at the same time.
But it should surely be viewed as a challenge to researchers to try to do more.46
An alternative view is that these negative results confirm what we
thought we already knew, which is that patents are not central to
appropriating the returns to R&D in most industries.  In addition to the
survey evidence discussed above, this view receives some support from
statistical estimates of the value of the patent right.  Such studies can be
interpreted to measure the implicit or equivalent subsidy that the existence
of the patent right provides to R&D.  Such studies typically show that the
magnitude of this subsidy varies by technological field, from as low as 5-10%
of research spending to a high of maybe 35% in some industries
(Schankerman, 1998; Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998).  For industries at
the lower end of this range, at least, one could imagine that even a significant
increase in the value of patent rights might still be too small relative to
overall costs and returns to have a measurable impact on innovative
behavior.
This broad review of where the literature stands suggests many
avenues for potentially fruitful research.  I would emphasize in particular the
desirability of:
•  efforts to understand how firms’ perceptions about the availability
of patents and the nature of their enforcement affect their research
investment decisions;
•  efforts to tie specific aspects of legal policy and practice to the
theoretical constructs that embody patent scope or breadth in the
theoretical literature;
•  modeling and empirical analysis of the process of licensing and the
extent to which transaction costs inhibit efficient bargaining
between and among holders of potentially conflicting patent rights.
•  efforts to understand how the apparent shrinking of the necessary
inventive step for non-obviousness relates to and interacts with the
broadening of patent scope represented by wider application of the
Doctrine of Equivalents;
•  analysis of what the growth in patenting in software, financial
products and business methods really represents, and how it is
affecting innovation.47
There is a widespread unease that the costs of stronger patent
protection may exceed the benefits.  Both theoretical and, to a lesser extent,
empirical research suggest this possibility.  Economists have long understood
that, at a theoretical level, technological competition can lead to a socially
excessive level of resources devoted to innovation.  The empirical literature is
convincing that, for the research process itself, the externalities are clearly
positive on balance (Griliches, 1992).  But to the extent that firms’ attention
and resources are, at the margin, diverted from innovation itself towards the
acquisition, defense and assertion against others of property rights, the social
return to the endeavor as a whole is likely to fall.  While the evidence on all
sides is scant, it is fair to say that there is at least as much evidence of these
effects of patent policy changes as there is evidence of stimulation of
research.
These questions are closely related to a broader debate as to whether
we are enjoying technological progress at a rate that is not adequately
reflected in the productivity statistics.  If history concludes that the end of
the twentieth century was a time of rapid and sustained technological
progress, it is likely also to conclude that the patent policy transition was a
good thing.  While we wait for this historical judgement, our failure to
demonstrate real effects of the policy changes that have been made should
make us very cautious about predicting that policy innovations affect the
innovation process.  At the same time, the dramatic increase in research
expenditure and the apparent signs of technological progress all around us
should make us cautious about concluding that the policy changes have had
no effect.48
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